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Abstract
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to
study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition ex-
ternalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds
a coalition structure formation mechanism.
This mechanism portions a set of strategies of the game into partition-
specific strategy domains, what makes every partition to be a non-
cooperative game with partition-specific payoffs for every player.
The mechanism includes a maximum coalition size, a set of eligible
partitions with coalitions sizes no greater than this number (which
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also serves as a restriction for a maximum number of deviators) and
a coalition structure formation rule. The paper defines a family of
nested non-cooperative games parametrized by a size of a maximum
coalition size.
Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The equilibrium can generate more than one coalition and encom-
passes intra and inter group externalities, what makes it different from
the Shapley value. Presence of individual payoff allocation makes it
different from a strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, and some
other equilibrium concepts. The accompanying papers demonstrate
applications of the proposed toolkit.
Keywords: Noncooperative Games
JEL : C72
1 Subject of the paper
The research topic of this paper was inspired by John Nash’s “Equilibrium
Points in n-person games ”(1950). This remarkably short, but highly influ-
ential note of only 5 paragraphs established an equilibrium concept and the
proof of its existence which did not require an explicit specification of a final
coalition structure for a set of players. Prior to Nash’s paper, the general-
ization of the concept of equilibrium provided by von Neumann for the case
of two-players zero-sum game was done by portioning the players into two
groups and regarding several players as a single player. However up to now,
non of these approaches resulted into expected progress in studying intra-
and inter group externalities between players.
In this paper ”coalition structure”, or ”partition”1 for short, is a collection
of non-overlapping subsets from a set of players, which in a union make the
1Existing literature uses both terms.
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original set. A group, or a coalition, is an element of a coalition structure or
of a partition.2
A partition induces two types of effects on a player’s payoff. The first,
through actions of players of the same coalition. These effects will be ad-
dressed as intra-coalition externalities. The second, from all other players,
who are outside coalition, and belong to different coalitions. This effects will
be addressed as inter -group externalities.
Nash (1953) suggested that cooperation should be studied within a group
and in terms of non-cooperative fundamentals. This suggestion is known now
as the Nash Program. Cooperative behavior was understood as an activity
inside a group with positive externalities between players. Nash did not write
explicitly about multi-coalition framework or coalition structures. Coalition
structures allow us to study inter-coalition externalities, along with intra-
coalition, ones and to separate cooperation in payoffs and cooperation in
allocation of players.
The best analogy for the difference between Nash Program and the cur-
rent research is the difference between partial and general strategic equilib-
rium analysis3 in economics. The former isolates a market ignoring cross-
market interactions, the latter explicitly studies cross market interactions.
The research agenda of the paper is: how to construct coalition structures
from actions of self-interested agents. Moreover, the paper offers a general-
ization of a non-cooperative game from Nash (1950) to address the problem
of coalition structure formation absent in Nash (1953). The contributions of
this paper are: a construction of a non-cooperative game with an embedding
coalition structure formation mechanism, and a parametrization of all con-
structed games by a number of deviators. The three subsequent papers will
demonstrate various applications of the model to different types of games,
including construction of a non-cooperative stability criterium and defining
2the same.
3meaning, strategic market games of Shapley and Shubik
3
a cooperation.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 presents an example, on
why studying inter-coalition externalities requires including coalition struc-
tures into individual strategy sets, Section 3 presents a general model of the
game, Section 4 presents an example of the game. The last section discusses
the approach used and the results of the paper.
2 An example: corporate dinner game
The simple example below shows why to study coalition structures we need
to incorporate them into a strategy set, what is different from Hart and Kurz
(1983). They studied coalition formation in terms of choice of a coalition by
every player, not of a coalition structure.
Consider a game of 4 players: A is a President; B is a senior vice-president;
C1, C2 are two other vice-presidents. They have a corporate dinner.
4 A
coalition is a group of players at one table. Every player may sit only at one
table. A coalition structure is an allocation of all players over no more than
four tables. Empty tables are not taken into account.
Individual set of strategies is a set of all coalition structures for the play-
ers, i.e. a set of all possible allocations of players over 4 non-empty tables.
A player chooses one coalition structure, an element from his strategy set. A
set of strategies in the game is a direct product of four individual strategy
sets. The choice of all players is a point in the set of strategies of the game.
Preferences of the players are such that everyone (besides A) would like to
have a dinner with A, but A only with B. Everyone wants players outside his
table to eat individually, due to possible dissipation of rumors or information
exchange. No one can enforce others to form or not to form coalitions.
In every coalition structure (or a partition) any coalition (i.e. a table)
4The game is designed to obtain pure strategies equilibrium for some of the players.
Compare this game with a lunch game in the next paper, where all players are identical,
and the result is a stochastic game, where states are equilibrium coalition structures.
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is formed only if everybody at the table agrees to have dinner together,
otherwise a non–selected player eats alone. Further we address this as a
coalition structure formation rule or a rule for simplicity. The same coalition
may belong to different coalition structures, but with different allocations of
players beyond it, compare lines 1 and 2 in Table 1 further.
The game is simultaneous and one shot. A realization of a final partition (
a coalition structure) depends on choices of coalition structures of all players.
A choice of a player is an element of his/her strategy set. Example. Let player
A choose {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}}; player B choose {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}}; player
C1 choose {{A,C1}, {B}, {C2}}, and player C2 choose {{A,C2}, {B}, {C2}}.
Then the final partition is {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}}. It is clear that a strong Nash
equilibrium (Aumann, 1960), which is based on a deviation of a coalition of
any size, does not discriminate between the coalition structures mentioned
above.
Payoff profile of all players in the game should be defined for every final
coalition structure. Table 1 presents coalition structures only with the best
individual payoffs.5 Thus only some partitions from the big set of all strate-
gies deserves attention. The first column is a number of a strategy. The
second column is an allocation of players over coalition structures, and also
is a list of the best6 final coalition structures from a set of all strategies. The
third column is an individual payoff profile of all players. The fourth column
is a list of values for coalitions in coalition structures if to calculate values
using cooperative game theory.
The game runs as follows. Players simultaneously announce individually
chosen coalition structures, what makes a point in a set of strategies of all
players. Then a final coalition structure is formed according to the rule
above, and payoffs are assigned for the formed coalition structure.
The way the game happens means that a set of all strategies is divided
5All other coalition structures have significantly lower payoffs.
6Payoffs in the rest coalition structures are much lower, and they are excluded from
consideration.
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Table 1: Strategies and payoffs in the corporate dinner game
num Best final partitions
Non-cooperative payoff profile
(UA, UB , UC1 , UC2)
Values of coalitions as in
cooperative game theory
1 {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}} (10,10,3,3) 20AB, 3C1 , 3C2
2∗ {{A,B}, {C1, C2}} (8,8,5,5) 16AB, 10C1,C2
3 {{A,C1}, {B,C2}} (3,5,10,5) 13AC1 , 10BC2
4 {{A,C1}, {B}, {C2}} (3,3,10,3) 13AC1, 3B, 3C2
5 {{A,C2}, {B,C1}} (3,5,5,10) 13AC2 , 10BC1
6 {{A,C2}, {B}, {C1}} (3,3,3,10) 13AC1, 3B, 3C1
7 all other partitions (0,0,0,0) all payoffs are 0
by the rule of coalition structure formation into domains: every domain
corresponds to exactly one coalition structure. Or in other words, every point
in the set of strategies of the game is assigned: exactly one final coalition
structure and payoffs for every player. A player may have different payoffs
in different coalition structures. Clearly a final coalition structure may not
coincide with someone’s initial choice.
Final payoffs have the following interpretation. Players A and B would
always like to be together. Being rational they would choose a coalition
structure with the highest payoff for them, i.e. the strategy 1. By the
same reason the first best choices of C1 and C2 would be to choose coalition
structures with A. But A will never choose to be with either of them. The
unavailability of the first best makes C1 and C2 to choose option 2.
7 By
doing so they do not disallow a coalition {A,B}, but reduce payoffs for A
and B. And players A and B cannot prevent this (or to insure against).
On the other hand, if players A and B choose strategy 2 they will obtain
coalition {A,B} in any case, but in a different final coalition structure. In
7In sociology this behavior is referred as a cooperation: players C1 and C2 group
together against other options when they are not together and have lower payoffs, player
A will never choose them. This problem will be addressed in the accompanying paper.
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terms of mixed strategies this means that an equilibrium mixed strategy
for A and for B is a whole probability space over two points, two coalition
structures 1 and 2. For simplicity payoffs in coalition structures with coalition
sizes three and four are much smaller.
From the forth column we can see that the corresponding cooperative
game has an empty core.
The constructed game has a unique equilibrium. In terms of individual
payoffs it is characterized as the second-best efficient for everybody. Equilib-
rium coalition structure contains two coalitions. This equilibrium is different
from the strong Nash and a coalition proof equilibria. Both these concepts
assume deviation of coalitions, but here definition of a coalition is not enough
to identify a final result of the game. Additional problems appear with cores
- what is a direction of a deviation, may players deviate simultaneously from
different coalitions, do deviators from different coalitions interact with each
other? Within cooperative game theory all these questions are left without
well-defined answers. The proposed formal game in the paper targets to pro-
vide coherent answers for these questions in terms of non-cooperative game
theory. And the result of the game allows to study inter / intra coalition
externalities in a consistent non-cooperative way.
The equilibrium in the corporate dinner game does not need super-additivity
of payoffs. There are also differences from partition approach (Yi, 1999), as,
for example, there is no initial allocation of players over coalitions.
3 Formal setup of the model
Nash (1950, 1951) suggested a non-cooperative game which consists of a set
of players N , with a general element i, sets of individual finite strategies
Si, i ∈ N , and payoffs, defined as a mapping from a set of all strategies
into payoff profiles of all players,
(
Ui(s)
)
i∈N
, such that S = ×i∈NSi 7→(
Ui(s)
)
i∈N
⊂ R#N , where
(
Ui(s)
)
i∈N
<∞, ∀s ∈ S.
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The suggested game modifies the mapping by preliminary portioning S
into coalition structure specific domains and assigning payoffs for every point
in these domains. The division of S is done with a coalition structure forma-
tion mechanism, defined further.
Let there is a set of agents N , with a general element i, a size of N is
#N , a finite integer, 2 ≤ #N <∞.
Every game has a parameter K, K ∈ {1, . . . ,#N}. This parameter has
two interpretations. Let for N agents there is a coalition with a maximum
size K. Then no more than K agents are required to dissolve it. The reverse
is also true: we need no more than K agents to form this maximum size K
coalition. Closeness of construction of the object under investigation requires
these two simultaneous interpretations for K be equal.
Every value of K from the set {1, . . . ,#N} induces a family of coalition
structures (or a family of partitions) P(K) over the set of all players N :
P(K) = {P = {gj : gj ⊂ N ; #g ≤ K;∪jgj = N ; ∀j1 6= j2 ⇒ gj1 ∩ gj2 = ∅}.
Every coalition gj in a partition P from P(K) has a size (a number of
members) no bigger than K, but can be less. The condition j1 6= j2 ⇒
gj1 ∩ gj2 = ∅ is interpreted as that an agent can participate only in one
coalition.
If we increase value of the parameter K by one, then we need to add
partitions from P(K + 1) \ P(K). This makes families of partitions for
different K be nested: P(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ P(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ P(K = N). The
bigger is K, the more coalition structures (or partitions) are involved into
consideration.
For every partition P an agent i has a finite strategy set Si(P ).
8 A set of
strategies of agent i for a family of coalition structures P(K) is
Si(K) =
{
si(K) : si(K) ∈ {Si(P ) : P ∈ P(K)}
}
8Finite strategies are chosen as used in Nash (1950),
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with a general element si(K). For a given K an agent chooses si(K) from
Si(K). A choice of si(K) means a choice of a desirable partition and an
action for this partition.9 If we increase the parameter K by one, then we
need to construct additional strategies only for the newly available coalition
structures from P(K + 1) \ P(K). This makes strategy sets for different K
be nested: Si(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Si(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Si(K = N).
The set of strategies for a fixed K is S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K), a direct product
of individual strategy sets of all players for the givenK. A choice of all players
s(K) =
(
si(K), . . . , sN(K)
)
is a point in S(K). For simplicity if there is no
ambiguity we will write s =
(
s1, . . . , sN
)
≡ s(K) =
(
si(K), . . . , sN(K)
)
.
It is clear that an increase in K induces nested strategy sets: S(K = 1) ⊂
. . . ⊂ S(K = N).
We have seen above that a mechanism to resolve conflicts between indi-
vidual choices is required. For every value of K from the set {1, . . . ,#N} we
define a coalition structure formation mechanism ( a mechanism or a rule for
short) R(K). For every strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S(K) the mech-
anism assigns a final coalition structure P , P ∈ P(K), and transports the
strategy profile s into the partition P . Further we will see that this makes
every P to be a game, as P will have a set of players, a non-trivial set of
strategies and partition specific payoffs over it’s own strategy set.
Definition 1. For every K a coalition structure formation mecha-
nism R(K) is a set of mappings such that:
1. A domain of R(K) is a set of all strategy profiles of S(K).
2. A range of R(K) is a finite number of subsets S(P ) ⊂ S(K), P ∈
P(K). S(P ) is a coalition structure specific strategy set .
3. Number of the subsets S(P ) is no more than a cardinality of P(K).
9A desirable partition may not realize. A coalition structure formation mechanism
resolves conflicts of partition choices between players.
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4. R(K) divides S(K) into coalition structure specific strategy sets, S(K) =
∪P∈P(K)S(P ).
5. Two different coalition structures, P¯ and P˜ , P¯ 6= P˜ , have different
coalition structure strategy sets S(P¯ ) ∩ S(P˜ ) = ∅.
Formally the same:
R(K) : S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K) 7→ :


∀s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S(K) ∃P ∈ P(K) : s ∈ S(P ),
S(K) = ∪P∈P(K)S(P ),
∀P¯ , P˜ ∈ P(K), P¯ 6= P˜ ⇒ S(P¯ ) ∩ S(P˜ ) = ∅.
.
Hence there are two ways to construct S(K): in terms of initial individual
strategies S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K), and in terms of realized partition strategies
S(K) = ∪P∈P(K)S(P ). Representation of S(K) in terms of coalition struc-
ture specific strategy sets may not be a direct product of sets, see an example
in the next section. We assume that a mechanism is given from outside.
If K increases we need to add only a mechanism for strategy sets from
S(K +1) \ S(K). This supports consistency of coalition structure formation
mechanisms for different K. The family of mechanisms is nested: : R(K =
1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ R(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ R(K = N).
Payoffs in the game are defined as state-contingent payoffs (or payoffs of
Arrow-Debreu securities) in finance. For every coalition structure P player i
has a payoff function Ui(P ) : S(P )→ R+, such that the set Ui(P ) is bounded,
Ui(P ) < ∞. Payoffs are considered as von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.
All payoffs of i for a game with no more than K deviators make a family:
Ui(K) =
{
Ui(P ) : P ∈ P(K)
}
. Every coalition structure has it’s own set of
strategies and a corresponding set of payoffs. Thus every coalition structure
is a non-cooperative game.
An increase in K also increases the number of possible partitions and
the set of strategies for every player. We need to add only payoffs for the
10
partitions in P(K + 1) \ P(K) or for strategies in Si(K + 1) \ Si(K). Thus
we obtain a nested family of payoff functions:
Ui(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Ui(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Ui(K = N).
We can easily see that this construction of payoffs allows to obtain both
intra and inter coalition (or group) externalities, as payoffs are defined di-
rectly over strategy profiles of all players and independently from allocation
of players in coalition structures.
Definition 2 ( a simultaneous coalition structure formation game).
A non-cooperative game for coalition structure formation is
Γ(K) =
〈
N,
{
K,P(K),R(K)
}
,
(
Si(K),Ui(K)
)
i∈N
〉
,
where
{
K,P(K),R(K)
}
- coalition structure formation mechanism ( a so-
cial norm, a social institute),
(
Si(K),Ui(K)
)
i∈N
- properties of players in
N , (individual strategies and payoffs), such that:
×i∈NSi(K)
R(K)
→
{
S(P ) : P ∈ P(K)
}
→
{
(Ui(K))i∈N
}
.
For a example, the corporate dinner game above was a game for K = 2,
where an equilibrium did not change with an increase in values of K from
K = 2 to K = 3, 4.
Novelty of the paper is an introduction of coalition structure formation
mechanism, which portions the set of all strategies into non-cooperative
partition-specific games. If we omit the mechanism part of the game and
eliminate restriction on coalition sizes then we obtain the traditional non-
cooperative game of Nash: ×i∈NSi(K) →
(
Ui(s)
)
i∈N
. Construction of a
game Γ(K) makes every partition P be an individual game.
Another novelty of the paper is an introduction of nested games.
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Definition 3 (family of games). A family of games is nested if :
Γ = Γ(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Γ(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Γ(K = N).
Nested games appear as a result of parametrization of a game by a max-
imum coalition size (or by a maximum number of deviators, what is equiva-
lent). All games have consistent nesting of components, for the same set of
players N .
Let Σi(K) be a set of all mixed strategies of i, i.e. a space of proba-
bility measures, Σi(K) =
{
σi(K) :
∫
Si(K)
dσi(K) = 1
}
, with a general el-
ement σi(K), where an integral is Lebegue-Stiltjes integral. Sets of mixed
strategies for all other players are defined in the standard way Σ−i(K) ={(
σj(K)
)
j 6=i
: ∀j 6= i
∫(
Sj(K)
)
j 6=i
(
dσj(K)
)
= 1
}
.
Expected utility can be defined in terms of strategies the players choose
or in terms of final partition-specific strategies. Expected utility of i in terms
of individual strategies is:
EU
Γ(K)
i (σi(K), σ−i(K)) =
∫
S(K)=×i∈NSi(K)
Ui(si, s−i)dσi(K)dσ−i(K)
or in terms of partition-specific strategies is
EU
Γ(K)
i (σi(K), σ−i(K)) =
∑
P∈P(K)
∫
S(P )
Ui(P )(si, s−i)dσi(K)dσ−i(K).
Expected utilities are constructed in the standard way.
Definition 4 ( an equilibrium in a game Γ(K) ). A mixed strategies
profile σ∗(K) = (σ∗i (K))i∈N is an equilibrium strategy profile for a game
Γ(K) if for every σi(K) 6= σ
∗
i (K) the following inequality for every player i
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from N holds true:
EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σ∗i (K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)
≥ EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σi(K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)
.
Equilibrium in the game Γ(K) is defined in a standard way. It’s existence
is just an expansion of Nash theorem. However this result for non-cooperative
games with coalition structure formation is different from the results of coop-
erative games, where an equilibrium may not exist, for example, in coalition
form games with empty cores. Another outcome of the model is that there is
no need to introduce additional properties of games, like axioms on a system
of payoffs, super-additivity, or weights. Equilibrium existence result can be
generalized for the whole family of games.
Theorem 1. The family of games G = {Γ(K), K = 1, 2, . . . , N} has an
equilibrium in mixed strategies, σ∗(G) = (σ∗(K = 1), . . . , σ∗(K = N)),(
σ∗(K)
)
i∈N
.
Technical side off the result is obvious. The theorem expands the classic
Nash theorem. An equilibrium in the game can also be characterized by
equilibrium partitions.
Definition 5 (equilibrium coalition structures or partitions). A set
of partitions {P ∗}(K), {P ∗}(K) ⊂ P(K), of a game Γ(K), is a set of equi-
librium partitions, if it is induced by an equilibrium strategy profile σ∗(K) =
(σ∗i (K))i∈N .
In the same way we can define equilibrium payoffs for the whole family of
games. This consideration is important for construction of a non-cooperative
stability criterium in the next paper.
In the example below we will see that there can be more than one equi-
librium partition, and equilibrium partitions may change with an increase in
the number of deviators. These issues are addressed in the accompanying
paper on applications of the suggested game.
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4 An example of a game of two players
The example serves to demonstrate two points. The constructed game has
the standard property of games: an equilibrium and efficiency concepts may
not coincide, what is different from strong Nash concept. The second is to
demonstrate that the concept of cooperation requires additional investigation
(done in the next paper). The example below is based on a generalization of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
There are 2 players. They can form two types of partitions. If K = 1
then there is only one final partition, P(K = 1) ≡ Psepar = {{1}, {2}}.
If K = 2 there are two final partitions, which make a family of partitions
P(K = 2) =
{
{{1}, {2}}, {1, 2}
}
. Further we will use the notation Pjoint =
{1, 2}. Clearly, partition structures P(K = 1) and P(K = 2) are nested.
Every player in every partition has two strategies: H(igh) and L(ow).
Player i for a game withK = 1 has a strategy set Si(K = 1) = {Li,Psepar , Hi,Psepar}.
Player i in the game with K = 2 has the strategy set Si(K = 2) =
{Li,Psepar , Hi,Psepar , Li,Pjoint , Hi,Pjoint}. Clearly, strategy sets Si(K = 1) and
Si(K = 2) are nested.
Set of strategies for the game withK = 1 is S(K = 1) = {L1,Psepar , H1,Psepar}×
{L2,Psepar , H2,Psepar}. Payoffs are in corresponding top-left cells of Table 2. Ev-
ery cell contains a payoff profile and a final coalition structure. The payoffs
in these cells are identical to the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Set of strategies for the game with K = 2 is
S(2) = {L1,Psepar , H1,Psepar , L1,Pjoint , H1,Pjoint}×{L2,Psepar , H2,Psepar , L2,Pjoint , H2,Pjoint}.
Strategy sets of games with K = 1 and K = 2 are nested, i.e. S(K = 1) ⊂
S(K = 2). Additional payoffs of the game for K = 1 are replicated from the
game with K = 1, see Table 2.
For K = 1 there are four outcomes, for K = 2 there are sixteen outcomes,
twelve new in comparison to K = 1.
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A coalition structure formation mechanisms for different K are R(K =
1),R(K = 2). The coalition structure formation mechanism is: the par-
tition Pjoint = {1, 2} can be formed only from a unanimous agreement of
both players. It is clear that for K = 1 only Psepar can be formed. The
grand coalition, or a partition Pjoint, can be formed only over the strategy
set (L1,Pjoint , H1,Pjoint) × (L2,Pjoint , H2,Pjoint). Otherwise the partition Psepar
is formed. Thus a set of strategies for the partition Psepar is not a direct
product of some sets. It is also clear that an increase in K results in nested
mechanisms: R(K = 1) ⊂ R(K = 2).
From Table 2 we can see that the whole strategy set of the game is par-
titioned into coalition structure specific domains. Every coalition structure (
or a partition) is a non-cooperative game with it’s own strategy set and pay-
off profiles. Final partition for a player may not coincide with an individual
choice. A set of strategies for the partition Psepar is not a product of sets.
Finally the games for K = 1 and K = 2 are nested.
Consider the game with a maximum coalition size K = 2 as described by
the Table 2. If both players choose strategies only for the partition Psepar,
then the game is the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game. However the same
coalition structure can be formed if some of the players does not choose any
strategy for Pjoint = {1, 2}. Thus for the final partition Psepar = {{1}, {2}}
there are three equilibria, and every equilibrium is inefficient. There are also
three efficient and desirable outcomes in the same partition.
The partition Pjoint = {1, 2} can be formed only if both players choose
it. Within this partition there is one inefficient equilibrium and one efficient
outcome.
Compare efficient payoff profiles for the partitions Psepar and Pjoint. They
have equal payoff profiles (0; 0), but their strategy profiles belong to different
final partitions. In other words, from observing only the payoff profile (0; 0)
we can not make a conclusion, which coalition structure is formed either
Psepar or Pjoint. Another interpretation is that cooperation may take place
15
as a cooperation in terms of positive externalities and in terms of allocation
of players in one coalition. We can see that they are different.
This means there are two kinds of cooperation - a cooperation in pay-
offs and a cooperation in allocation of players over coalitions. The example
demonstrates that they may not coincide. More on that in the next paper.
Using the same game we can demonstrate appearance of intra- and inter-
coalitions externalities. If partition Pjoint = {1, 2} is formed, then an in-
dividual payoff of a player depends on a strategy of another in the same
coalition ( presence of intra-coalition or intra-group externality). If partition
Psepar = {{1}, {2}}, is formed then an individual payoff of a player depends
on a strategy of another player in the different coalition ( presence of inter-
coalition or inter-group externality).
Multiplicity of equilibria makes both of these externalities co-exist in
equilibria, but in different final coalition structures. Thus the game is able
to present both intra and inter-coalition externalities, what is impossible in
cooperative game theory.
Table 2: Payoff for the family of games with unanimous formation rules.
Different partitions have payoff-equal efficient outcomes.
L2,Psepar H2,Psepar L2,Pjoint H2,Pjoint
L1,Psepar
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,Psepar
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
L1,Pjoint
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0; 0)
{1, 2}
(−5; 3)
{1, 2}
H1,Pjoint
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
(3;−5)
{1, 2}
(-2;-2)
{1, 2}
We can reinstall uniqueness of an equilibrium, what is done in Table 3.
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Table 3: Payoff for two extrovert players who, obtain additional payoffs ǫ
being in one coalition Pjoint, when it is realized. Uniqueness of an equilibrium
is reinstalled.
L2,Psepar H2,Psepar L2,Pjoint H2,Pjoint
L1,Psepar
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,Psepar
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
L1,Pjoint
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0 + ǫ; 0 + ǫ)
{1, 2}
(−5 + ǫ; 3 + ǫ)
{1, 2}
H1,Pjoint
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
(3 + ǫ;−5 + ǫ)
{1, 2}
(-2+ǫ;-2+ǫ)
{1, 2}
If both players are extroverts and prefer be together,10 then every individual
payoff increases by ǫ > 0, if the grand coalition is realized. This means that
a change of the game from Γ(1) to Γ(2) changes the equilibrium in terms of
both strategies and the partitions.
If both players are introverts, ǫ < 0, then the expansion of the game will
not change initial equilibrium in terms of both strategies and the partition.
This case is not presented here and is left for future.
5 Discussion
Insufficiency of cooperative game theory to study coalitions and coalition
structures was earlier reported by many authors. Maskin (2011) wrote that
“features of cooperative theory are problematic because most applications of
game theory to economics involve settings in which externalities are impor-
tant, Pareto inefficiency arises, and the grand coalition does not form”. My-
10what is equivalent to preferences over coalition structures
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erson (p.370, 1991) noted that “we need some model of cooperative behavior
that does not abandon the individual decision-theoretic foundations of game
theory”. Thus there is a demand for a specially designed non-cooperative
game to study coalition structures formation along with an adequate equi-
librium concept for this game.
There is a voluminous literature on the topic, a list of authors is far from
complete: Aumann, Hart, Holt, Maschler, Maskin, Myerson, Peleg, Roth,
Serrano, Shapley, Schmeidler, Weber, Winter, Wooders and many others.
A popular approach to use a “threat”as a basic concept for coalition for-
mation analysis was suggested by Nash (1953). Consider a strategy profile
from a subset of players. Let this profile be a threat to someone, beyond
this subset. The threatening players may produce externalities for each
other (and negative externalities not excluding!). How credible could be such
threat? At the same time there may be some other player beyond the subset
of players who may obtain a bonanza from this threat. But this beneficiant
may not join the group due to expected intra-group negative externalities for
members or from members of this group. Thus a concept of a threat can not
serve as an elementary concept.
The justification of a chosen tool, a non-cooperative game, comes from
Maskin (2011) and a remark of Serrano (2014), that for studying coalition
formation “it may be worth to use strategic-form games, as proposed in the
Nash program”.
The difference of the research agenda in this paper from the Nash program
(Serrano 2004) is studying non-cooperative formation of coalition structures,
but not only formation of one coalition. The best analogy for the difference
is the difference between partial and general strategic equilibrium analysis in
economics. The former isolates a market ignoring cross-market interactions,
the latter explicitly studies cross market interactions.
The constructed finite non-cooperative game allows to study what can
be a cooperative behavior, when the individuals “rationally further their
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individual interests” ( Olson, 1971).
Nash (1950, 1951) suggested to construct a non-cooperative game as a
mapping of a set of strategies into a profile of payoffs, ×i∈NSi → (Ui)i∈N .
This paper has two contributions in comparison to his paper: construction
of a non-cooperative game with an embedding coalition structure formation
mechanism, and parametrization of all constructed games by a number of
deviators: ×i∈NSi(K)
R(K)
→ {S(P ) : P ∈ P(K)} → {(Ui(K))i∈N}, where
K ∈ {1, . . . ,#N}. The game suggested by Nash becomes a partial case for
these games.
Every game in a family has an equilibrium, may be in mixed strategies.
This differs from results of cooperative game theory, where games may have
no equilibrium, like games with empty cores, etc.
The introduced equilibrium concept differs from the strong Nash, coalition-
proof and k equilibrium concepts. The differences are: an explicit allocation
of payoffs and a combined presence of intra- and inter- coalition (or group)
externalities (the list of differences is not complete). Differences from the
core approach of Aumann (1960) are clear: a presence of externalities, no
restrictions that only one group deviates, no restrictions on the direction of
a deviation (inside or outside), and a construction of individual payoffs from
a strategy profile of all players. There is no need to assume transferable util-
ities for players. The approach allows to study coalition structures, which
differ from the grand coalition as in Shapley value. Finally the introduced
concepts enables to offer a non-cooperative necessary stability criterion based
only on an equilibrium of a game. This is impossible for any other equilibrium
concept.
The suggested approach is different in a role for a central planner offered
by Nash, who “argued that cooperative actions are the result of some process
of bargaining” Myerson (p.370, 1991). The central planner offers a predefined
coalition structure formation mechanism, that includes a maximum number
of deviators, family of eligible partitions and a family of rules to construct
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these partitions from individual strategies of players.
The accompanying papers will demonstrate application of the suggested
model for studying stochastic Bayesian games, cooperation, self-enforcement
properties of an equilibrium (Aumann, 1990), non-cooperative criterion of
partition stability, focal points, application of the same mechanism to study
network games and repeated games.
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